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I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
by employers against any individual employee "with respect to [his or
her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of ... sex." 1 Currently, uncertainties exist among the federal
courts regarding the meaning of the words "because of ... sex" in Ti-
tle VII, especially in the context of sex discrimination claims brought
by a transsexual or a homosexual plaintiff. Specifically, is discrimina-
tion based on one's "transsexuality" or "homosexuality" discrimina-
tion "because of sex" for purposes of Title VII?
Recent medical studies suggest that there are, in the United
States, millions of these intersexed individuals whose biological fac-
tors determining sex3 are ambiguous. Transsexuals refer to these indi-
* J.D. Candidate 2002, Seattle University School of Law; B.A., University of Washington. I
would like to extend my deepest thanks to Professor Gregory Silverman, Professor Julie Shapiro,
Ken Roessler, Rick Morris, Erin Norgaard, Joshua Furman, and all the Seattle University Law
Review members. Special thanks go to my family and Robert Miracle for their support, espe-
cially for the latter's continuous editorial assistance.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994), amended by 105 Stat. 1071.
2. See Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough,
SCIENCES, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 20, 21 (citing a study showing that as many as four percent of live
births are of "intersexed" individuals).
3. The word "sex" as used in this Note denotes the biological factors associated with
"man" or "woman." See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing
the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society,
83 CAL. L. REV. 3, 21 (1995) (using the word sex as denoting "a physical attribute of humans:
external genital anatomy"); see also Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimina-
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viduals whose gender4 identity does not match their sex assigned at
birth.' Transsexuals feel trapped in a body of the wrong sex and seek
release by way of sex reassignment surgery or sometimes even suicide.6
They do not view themselves as a transsexual because their self-
identity is either male or female.' With the exact causes of transsex-
ualism being still in dispute,' society often confuses transsexuals with
homosexuals or transvestites. Homosexuals are those "sexually at-
tracted to persons of the same sex," 9 and transvestites are those who
occasionally dress in clothes of the opposite sex.1" Homosexuals and
transvestites, unlike transsexuals, have no desire to change their anat-
omy.
11
Until the Ninth Circuit's decision in Schwenk v. Hartford2 in
February of 2000, the federal circuit courts addressing the issue of Ti-
tle VII's applicability to transsexuals had consistently held that dis-
crimination based on one's transsexual status is not actionable because
the word "sex" in the Act refers only to "anatomical sex," not gender
identity. 3 Also, until recently, the federal circuits uniformly rejected
tion Law: The Disaggregation of Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1995) (describing
the convention of using the word "sex" as "a product of nature").
4. The word "gender" as used in this Note denotes the socially-constructed masculine or
feminine characteristics related to sex. See Valdes, supra note 3, at 21 (using the word gender as
signifying "the social or cultural dimensions derived from and determined by sex"); see also
Franke, supra note 3, at 1-2 (arguing that the disaggregation of sex as "a product of nature" from
gender as "a function of culture" in sex discrimination law is "a central mistake of equality juris-
prudence").
5. Julie A. Greenberg, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality
and the Collision between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 289 (1999); see also Farmer v.
Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 319-20 (7th Cir. 1993) (opinion of Posner, J.) ("A transsexual is a person
who considers himself to be of the male gender although he has the female sexual organs, or,
more commonly .... considers herself to be of the female gender but has the male sexual or-
gans.").
6. Anita C. Barnes, Note, The Sexual Continuum: Transsexual Prisoners, 24 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 599, 608-l (1998) (citing the chairperson at Johns Hopkins
Medical Institute, who addressed "the high incidence of suicide and self-mutilation among trans-
sexuals"); see also Julie Deardorff, Gender Conflicts Given Clear Place of Study, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
22, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 4054106 (noting that few transsexuals can afford sex reas-
signment surgery, which costs more than $15,000). The cost of female-to-male surgery includ-
ing removal and closing of vagina and construction of a penis can top $100,000. E.g., Kim Fol-
stad, Man Who Became Woman Wants to Live as Man Again, Cox NEWS SERV., Mar. 10, 2001,
Lifestyle, available at LEXIS, News, Cox News Service.
7. SUZANNE KESSLER & WENDY MCKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL
APPROACH 121 (1978).
8. See Barnes, supra note 6, at 608-11 (noting the debate as to whether the origin of trans-
sexualism is "psychological or physical").
9. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1083 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 204 F.3d 1187 (9thCir. 2000).
13. See discussion infra Part II(A).
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homosexual plaintiffs' Title VII sex discrimination claims by holding
that discrimination based on one's "sexual orientation" is not dis-
crimination "because of sex."' 4
The Ninth Circuit in Schwenk departed from the "anatomical
sex" approach, declaring that the word "sex" in Title VII encompasses
both biological sex and socially-constructed gender."5 The court com-
bined the ban on "sex stereotyping" under the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins6 with the recognition of male-on-
male sex discrimination claims in another Supreme Court decision,
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 7 to conclude that dis-
crimination based on one's failure to meet gender expectations is ac-
tionable under Title VII.' t
The Ninth Circuit's decision created a split in authority with the
Seventh Circuit, which continues to cite its "anatomical sex" rule with
approval."' Although the Ninth Circuit pronounced the expansive
definition of sex in Title VII in the context of a transsexual plaintiff in
Schwenk, which was followed in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enter-
prises, Inc.,20 a recent decision involving an effeminately-perceived
male plaintiff, the court continues to invoke the rigid sex/sexual orien-
tation dichotomy in rejecting homosexual plaintiffs' sex discrimination
claims.2'
The Ninth Circuit's "sex plus gender" approach in Schwenk is
superior to the "anatomical sex" rule, whose underlying premises are
flawed. The Seventh Circuit's continued adherence to such a rule is
pure formalism and irreconcilable with Price Waterhouse and Oncale.
Also, the Ninth Circuit's recent refusal to recognize sexual orientation
discrimination as actionable sex stereotyping is inconsistent with, and
a step backwards from, its dynamic reading of sex in Schwenk.
14. See discussion infra Part III.
15. 204 F.3d at 1202. While some scholars have treated this part of the Schwenk opinion as
dicta, see, e.g., Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need To Include Transgender
Rights In The Struggles For Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 399
(2001), this Note treats it as a holding since it is part of the essential analytical foundations of the
court's opinion. See discussion infra Part II(C). According to Judge Posner, a dictum is "a
statement in a judicial opinion that could have been deleted without seriously impairing the ana-
lytical foundations of the holding-that, being peripheral, may not have received the full and
careful consideration of the court that uttered it." Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d
1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1986).
16. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
17. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
18. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202.
19. See discussion infra Part III(E).
20. No. 99-35579, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15899 (9th Cir. July 16, 2001).
21. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Sex discrimination occurs primarily because of societal gender
norms governing how a man or a woman should be.22 There is no
theoretically satisfactory boundary between sex discrimination on the
one hand and gender or sexual orientation discrimination on the
other. 3 Such an unrealistic categorization will only lead to confusion
and indeterminacy in law.
This Note examines a new development in federal Title VII sex
discrimination jurisprudence specifically in the context of transsexual
and homosexual plaintiffs, describing the courts' gradual shift away
from formalism towards a more realistic approach in this area. Part II
begins by examining the anatomical sex rule established by the three
major pre-Schwenk decisions categorically rejecting transsexuals' Title
VII claims. This section then considers the two subsequent Supreme
Court decisions, Price Waterhouse and Oncale, and the Ninth Circuit's
Schwenk opinion. Part II concludes that the Schwenk court correctly
read Price Waterhouse and Oncale as mandating a departure from the
anatomical sex approach.
Part III looks at the federal courts' confusing application of Title
VII sex discrimination law to homosexual plaintiffs, arguing that the
courts' use of the sex/sexual orientation dichotomy is unwise and in-
herently unworkable. Part IV analyzes and critiques the anatomical
sex rule as a legal principle, and Part V examines the likelihood of suc-
cess for future transsexual and homosexual Title VII sex discrimina-
tion plaintiffs. In the Conclusion, this Note argues that the courts
should follow the Ninth Circuit's "sex plus gender" approach in
Schwenk as being both consistent with Price Waterhouse and Oncale
and superior to the anatomical sex rule. Finally, this Note contends
that the courts should read Title VII dynamically to reach discrimina-
tion based on societal male/female binarism and heterosexual gender
stereotypes.
II. WHAT Do WE MEAN BY DISCRIMINATION "BECAUSE OF
SEX?"
A. The Anatomical Sex Rule: Holloway; Sommers; and Ulane
When a transsexual individual brings a sex discrimination claim
under Title VII, federal courts confront the issue as to the meaning of
22. Franke, supra note 3, at 2 (arguing that "almost every claim with regard to sexual iden-
tity or sex discrimination can be shown to be grounded in normative gender rules and roles").
23. See Valdes, supra note 3, at 12-16 (explaining how sex "conflates" with gender and sex
and gender "conflate" with sexual orientation).
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discrimination "because of sex."24  Until the Schwenk decision, the
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had categorically rejected trans-
sexual plaintiffs' sex discrimination claims by defining the word "sex"
narrowly to mean only one's biological or anatomical sex status as a
man or a woman. The following cases are illustrative of the anatomi-
cal sex rule established by the three federal circuits.
The Ninth Circuit decision, Holloway v. Arthur Andersen &
Co.,25 involved a male-to-female transsexual plaintiff, Ramona Hollo-
way.26 Holloway started working for the defendant company Arthur
Andersen in 1969 as Robert Holloway and started hormone treat-
ments in February of 1974 in preparation for sex reassignment sur-
gery.27  In November of the same year, Holloway had her name
changed on company records to Ramona.2" Following these changes,
on November 18, 1974, her employment was terminated. 29 Holloway
sued the company under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the ba-
sis of her transsexuality.3° The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of the company's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, holding that discrimination "because she is a transsexual who
chose to change her sex" is not discrimination "because of sex."31 The
court declared that Congress intended the word "sex" to mean only
the "traditional notions of sex," which, according to the court, did not
embrace transsexuality.
32
The Eighth Circuit case, Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 3
involved a self-described transsexual, Audra Sommers, who consid-
ered herself "a female with the anatomical body of a male. '34  Som-
mers was hired by the defendant company, Budget Marketing
(Budget), on August 22, 1980, to do clerical work.3" Two days later,
Budget terminated her employment.36 Sommers sued Budget under
24. See Franke, supra note 3, at 35. Professor Franke describes the two-part process the
court pursues in determining the meaning of "discrimination because of... sex" in the context
of a transsexual plaintiff: (1) identifying the wrong Title VII was intended to rectify (e.g., "dis-
crimination against women [or men] because of their status as females [or males]") and (2) clari-
fying "what it means by female and male" (e.g., biological categorization). Id.
25. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).




30. Id. at 661.
31. Id. at 664.
32. Id. at 662.
33. 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
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Title VII, alleging that the company fired her because of her sex.37
The company countered that the termination was due to her misrepre-
sentation of herself as an anatomical female in applying for the job.38
Budget also alleged that its work environment was disrupted by other
female employees' threats to quit if the company allowed Sommers to
use the women's restroom.39 The district court entered summary
judgment for the company.4" Upon appeal, Sommers argued for the
expansion of Title VII's coverage to accommodate those "who are
psychologically female, albeit biologically male. '"41 Nonetheless, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment, holding that it is
one's anatomy that determines ''sex" within the meaning of Title
VII.4
2
In the Seventh Circuit case, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.," the
plaintiff pilot, a male-to-female transsexual, was hired by the defen-
dant Eastern Airlines in 1968 as Kenneth Ulane. 4 Ulane had "felt
like a female" since early childhood. 45  In 1980, Kenneth-turned-
Karen underwent sex reassignment surgery.46 Ulane succeeded in
having her birth certificate amended to reflect her self-identified fe-
male gender and also in having the FAA certify her for flight status as
a female.47 In 1981, Ulane was fired by Eastern Airlines, and she sued
the company for sex discrimination under Title VII. 48 The district
court entered judgment in favor of Ulane after a bench trial, holding
that the word "sex" in Title VII encompasses "sexual identity," thus
awarding her reinstatement as a flying officer. 49 The Seventh Circuit,
however, reversed, holding that the term "sex" in Title VII refers only
to a "biological male or biological female."5
37. Id.
38. Id. at 748.
39. Id. at 748-49.
40. Id. at 748.
41. Id. at 749.
42. Id. (holding that Audra, "for the purposes of Title VII, is male because she is an ana-
tomical male").
43. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
44. Id. at 1082.
45. Id. at 1083 (noting that Ulane was diagnosed as a transsexual in 1979).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1082.
49. Id. at 1082-84.
50. Id. at 1087.
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B. The Meaning of Price Waterhouse and Oncale
Two Supreme Court cases decided after Holloway, Sommers, and
Ulane cast doubt on the viability of these decisions, signaling a new
turn in federal sex discrimination law.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a 1989 decision, the plaintiff, a
female senior manager in the defendant accounting company, sued the
company after she was denied partnership partly because she was
"macho."'" She had been advised, if she wished to become a partner
of the firm, to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jew-
elry." 52
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan first set forth the critical
inquiry: "whether gender was a factor" in the employment decision."
He then declared that employment decisions based on "sex stereo-
types" are actionable under Title VII because "an employer who acts
on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender." 4 The Court justified
this "sex stereotyping" rule by treating the language of Title VII as
dynamic, not static. Said the Court:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the
day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group, for in forbidding employers to discriminate against indi-
viduals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women re-
sulting from sex stereotypes.55
Nine years after Price Waterhouse, in 1998, the Court in Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. 6 addressed the issue of whether
male-on-male sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.57 Be-
fore Oncale, the federal circuits were divided as to whether Title VII
applies to same-sex sexual harassment claims." In that case, Joseph
51. 490 U.S. 228, 231-35 (1989).
52. Id. at 235.
53. Id. at 241. Throughout the opinion, the Court used the words "sex" and "gender" in-
terchangeably.
54. Id. at 250.
55. Id. at 251 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
56. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
57. Id. at 76. A "sexual harassment" Title VII claim refers to a claim alleging an "abusive
working environment" created by "sufficiently severe or pervasive" sexual harassment, which is
actionable under Title VII as a form of sex discrimination. See Meritor Says. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
58. Some courts had held that male-on-male sex discrimination is never actionable under
Title VII. E.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996). Other
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Oncale, a male employee, sued his former employer and several em-
ployees under Title VII alleging sexual harassment. 9 Oncale alleged
that he was subjected to physical sexual attacks by his male supervi-
sors and co-workers.6" He also alleged that he was called names "sug-
gesting homosexuality."'" The district court granted the employer's
summary judgment motion by holding that same-sex sex discrimina-
tion is not actionable under Title VII, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.62
A unanimous Court, in a decision written by Justice Scalia, re-
versed, holding that Title VII reaches same-sex, as well as male-on-
female or female-on-male, sex discrimination.63 In so holding, the
Court reasoned that "[sjtatutory prohibitions often go beyond the
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately
the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed."64
While rejecting a per-se rule against same-sex sex discrimination
claims, however, the Court emphasized the statutory "because of...
sex" language as limiting the scope of actionable discrimination.6"
Specifically, the Court held that the critical inquiry is whether "mem-
bers of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.
66
This membership test suggests that there are only two memberships
of sex: male and female.
Taken together, these two opinions expanded the scope of sex
discrimination covered by Title VII in establishing at least the follow-
ing: (1) that Title VII reaches sex stereotyping; (2) that the Act
reaches not only those evils that Congress initially hoped to eliminate
but also "reasonably comparable evils"; and (3) that these evils may
change over time. The caveat is, of course, Oncale's "membership"
language, which appears to delimit the scope of the Act. The question
is whether the anatomical sex rule survived Price Waterhouse and On-
cale.
courts had held that same-sex sexual discrimination claims are actionable only when the plaintiff
could prove that the alleged harasser was homosexual. E.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd.
of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
59. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.
60. Id.
61. Id. There is no mention in the opinion as to whether Oncale was homosexual.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 78.
64. Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 80 (holding that Title VII is "directed only at discrimination because of sex").
66. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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This issue subsequently arose in Schwenk, albeit in the context of
a now-invalidated statute, the Gender Motivated Violence Act
(GMVA).
C. Schwenk: A Departure from the Anatomical Sex Rule
In a unanimous decision by a three-judge panel, the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Schwenk v. Hartford declared that the Holloway line of cases
had effectively been "overruled" by the "logic and language" of Price
Waterhouse and Oncale.8 The facts of Schwenk are as follows. Doug-
las (Crystal) Schwenk was a self-identified pre-operative male-to-
female transsexual, who claimed to have been "psychologically fe-
male" since the age of twelve.69 Known as "Crystal Marie," Schwenk
"[had] shoulder-length hair, [was] extremely soft-spoken, [cried] eas-
ily, and [used] make-up and other female grooming products when
possible."70
Schwenk was incarcerated in 1993 in Washington's all-male
penitentiary, where the defendant Robert Mitchell worked as a prison
guard.71 Upon her arrival, Schwenk told Mitchell about her intention
to have sex reassignment surgery as well as the fact that she was a
transsexual.7 From that time forward, Mitchell allegedly subjected
Schwenk to a series of "sexual advances and harassment," which led to
a "sexual assault.
73
Subsequently, Schwenk sued Mitchell and other prison officials
for, inter alia, a violation of the GMVA, alleging attempted rape by
Mitchell.74 The Act prohibited "gender-motivated violence," that is,
"crime[s] of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of
gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's
gender. ' 75  The district court denied Mitchell's summary judgment
motion on Schwenk's GMVA claim, and Mitchell appealed, asserting,
67. Gender Motivated Violence Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). The Supreme Court held
that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress authority to
enact this section. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
68. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201.




73. Id. Schwenk alleged that Mitchell began his sexual harassment with "winking, per-
forming explicit actions imitating oral sex, making obscene and threatening comments, watching
[Schwenk] in the shower while 'grinding' his hand on his crotch area, and repeatedly demanding
that [Schwenk] engage in sexual acts with him." Id.
74. Seeid. at 1192.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c); Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1198.
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inter alia, that Schwenk failed to state a claim under the GMVA be-
cause the Act did not cover transsexuals. 6
First, the Ninth Circuit held that proof of gender motivation un-
der the GMVA proceeds in the same way as proof of sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII.77 The court then rejected Mitchell's argument
that male-on-male sexual attack is not "gender-motivated" within the
meaning of the Act, concluding that its reading of the GMVA as pro-
scribing male-on-male sexual violence is consistent with the Oncale
proposition that male-on-male sex discrimination is actionable under
Title VII.7
8
The court next considered Mitchell's argument that Schwenk's
GMVA claim lacked merit because Schwenk alleged only that
Mitchell's sexual violence occurred because of her transsexuality,
which was not an element of gender.79 Thus, the court confronted the
issue of the meaning of gender in the GMVA, which, the court con-
cluded, was synonymous with the meaning of sex in Title VII. The
court had to decide whether the anatomical sex rule under its Holloway
decision was still good law after Price Waterhouse and Oncale.
The Ninth Circuit refused to follow its Holloway precedent. It
declared that both the GMVA and Title VII prohibit "discrimination
based on gender as well as sex. '"80 The court held that, under Price
Waterhouse, Title VII prohibits "discrimination because one fails to
act in the way expected of a man or woman."'" The court proclaimed
the ground-breaking rule that the word "sex" in Title VII "encom-
passes both sex-that is, the biological differences between men and
women-and gender."82 With that holding, Holloway was invalidated.
In applying this principle, the court found sufficient evidence to
conclude that "Mitchell's actions were motivated, at least in part, by
Schwenk's gender," that is, "by her assumption of a feminine rather
than a typically masculine appearance or demeanor." 3
Schwenk's interpretation of Price Waterhouse as extending Title
VII's reach to gender discrimination is sound. Discrimination in the
form of sex stereotypes is discrimination based on gender, that is,
one's socially-expected masculine or feminine characteristics. Trans-
76. 204 F.3d at 1199.
77. Id. at 1200-01 (citing S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 53 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, pt.
III.C.4.c., at 50 (1991)).
78. Id. at 1199-1200.
79. Id. at 1200.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 1202 (noting that Mitchell's demands for sex began after his discovery of
Schwenk's transsexuality and escalated as he saw Schwenk's femininity).
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sexuals are often victims of sex stereotypes; they are discriminated
against because of their perceived failure to conform to their male or
female sex status. After all, discrimination against a female because of
her "macho" personality is hardly distinguishable from discrimination
against a male-to-female transsexual because of her assumption of
"femininity." Also, from a policy perspective, the goal of Title VII,
which is "to drive employers to focus on qualifications rather than
on... sex"84 favors the Schwenk approach. Sex discrimination exists
because of the normative values attached to sex by society.8" Proscrib-
ing discrimination that is based on one's transsexuality, or gender
identity, would further the Title VII goal by closing a loophole in the
sex discrimination law.
Schwenk is the first case to re-evaluate the anatomical sex rule af-
ter Price Waterhouse and Oncale in the context of transsexuals.
Schwenk is also the first case to expressly declare that Price Waterhouse
overruled the Holloway line of cases. Since Schwenk, one district court
has commented on the issue of Title VII's applicability to transsexu-
als, dismissing a female-to-male transsexual plaintiffs sex discrimina-
tion claim on other grounds while noting the uncertainty as to whether
the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping rule applies to transsexuals.86
Also, more recently, a court in New Jersey, after discussing federal
case law including Price Waterhouse and Schwenk, held that sex dis-
crimination under the state's Law Against Discrimination "includes
gender discrimination so as to protect [the male-to-female transsexual]
plaintiff from gender stereotyping and discrimination for transforming
herself from a man to a woman." 7
In the following section, this Note addresses the federal circuits'
inconsistent application of Title VII sex discrimination law to homo-
sexual plaintiffs after Price Waterhouse and Oncale. The success of
homosexual plaintiffs in seeking redress for sex discrimination under
Title VII, like that of their transsexual counterparts, depends on how
courts interpret the words "because of sex." Under the anatomical sex
regime, the word "sex" encompasses neither transsexuality nor homo-
sexuality (sexual orientation).88 The question is how Price Waterhouse
and Oncale undermine a categorical rejection of homosexual plaintiffs'
Title VII claims for discrimination based on sexual orientation.
84. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (emphasis added).
85. Franke, supra note 3, at 2.
86. Broadus v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 98-4254, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19919, at *11-14
(W.D. Mo. Oct. 11, 2000).
87. Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Sys., Nos. A-2017-99T5, A-5581-99T5, 2001 N.J.
Super. LEXIS 283, at *2-21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 3, 2001).
88. E.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1984).
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The First and Second Circuits appear to have departed from the
anatomical sex rule by suggesting that Price Waterhouse's sex stereo-
typing rule provides homosexual plaintiffs with another theory in
which to plead sex discrimination under Title VII while the Seventh
Circuit continues to cite Ulane with approval.89 At the same time,
these three circuits, as well as the Ninth Circuit, invariably reject ho-
mosexual plaintiffs' "sexual orientation" discrimination claims.9" The
Eighth Circuit, however, recently rejected a rigid application of the
sex/sexual orientation categorization. 9
III. THE MEANING OF "SEX" IN THE HOMOSEXUAL CONTEXT
A. First Circuit: Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.92
Before Schwenk, the First Circuit in Higgins v. New Balance Ath-
letic Shoe, Inc. had suggested that discrimination based on the failure
to meet stereotyped expectations of femininity and masculinity is ac-
tionable under Price Waterhouse in the context of a homosexual Title
VII plaintiff.93 Higgins involved a male homosexual plaintiff, Robert
Higgins, who sued his former employer for, inter alia, sexual harass-
ment under Title VII.94 Higgins alleged that he was subjected to dis-
criminatory remarks and actions by his supervisor and co-workers be-
cause of his homosexuality. The district court granted the
defendant's summary judgment motion, holding that Higgins failed to
allege discrimination "because of sex,"96 and the First Circuit af-
firmed. 97
Relying on Price Waterhouse and Oncale, the First Circuit held
that "a man can ground a claim on evidence that other men discrimi-
nated against him because he did not meet stereotyped expectations of
masculinity."98  The court, however, dismissed Higgins's sex stereo-
typing argument because he neither argued such a theory nor men-
tioned the Price Waterhouse decision at the lower court level. 99
89. See discussion infra Part III.
90. See discussion infra Part III.
91. See discussion infra Part III.
92. 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999).
93. Id. at 261 n.4.
94. Id. at 256.
95. Id.
96. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 66, 75-76 (D. Me. 1998).
97. 194 F.3dat261.
98. Id. at 261 n.4 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 258-59.
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While recognizing the sex stereotyping rule under Price Water-
house and the viability of male-on-male sex discrimination claims un-
der Oncale, the court categorically rejected Higgins's sexual orienta-
tion discrimination claim as falling outside the scope of Title VII.
The court quoted the Oncale "sex membership" test as delineating the
statutory "because of sex" requirement."0 The court went on to hold
that it is "settled law" that "as drafted and authoritatively construed,
Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply because of sexual ori-
entation......
Does this approach make sense? According to the opinion, a
homosexual male may seek redress under Title VII for stereotypes
implying his perceived "femininity" but not for stereotypes connoting
his "homosexuality." Isn't having a sexual partner who is of a differ-
ent sex one of the societal gender norms? If a person is discriminated
against because of his or her having a sexual partner of the same sex, it
necessarily follows that he or she is discriminated against because of
his or her failure to conform to gender-based social expectations.
By accepting the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping rule, how-
ever, the First Circuit, in effect, departed from the anatomical sex rule.
While recognizing gender discrimination as covered by Title VII, the
First Circuit failed to recognize that discrimination based on sexual
orientation is gender discrimination.
B. Second Circuit: Simonton v. Runyon 02
The Second Circuit decision, Simonton v. Runyon, reflects the
court's uncertainty as to the applicability of the Price Waterhouse sex
stereotyping rule to homosexual sexual harassment plaintiffs. In that
case, a homosexual male postal worker, Dwayne Simonton, sued his
employer under Title VII for sex discrimination, alleging that his co-
workers repeatedly harassed him with such comments as "go fuck
yourself, fag," "suck my dick," "so you like it up the ass?", and "fuck-
ing faggot."10 3 Simonton's allegations also included notes posted in
the employees' bathroom associating his name with that of a celebrity
with AIDS, pornographic pictures posted in his work area, male dolls
placed in his car, as well as copies of Playgirl magazine sent to his
home.' The district court dismissed Simonton's claim as a non-
100. Id.
101. Id. at 259.
102. 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000).
103. Id. at 34-35.
104. Id.
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actionable sexual orientation discrimination claim, and the Second
Circuit affirmed. 05
First, the Second Circuit followed the First Circuit's suit in
drawing a line between discrimination based on "sex" and discrimina-
tion based on "sexual activity regardless of gender," holding that only
the former is actionable under Title VII. °6 Relying on Oncale, the
court held that the word "sex" in Title VII refers only to "member-
ship in a class delineated by gender."' 7 Under this membership test,
Simonton's claim failed because sexual orientation is not a gender-
delineated construct in the court's opinion.0 8
Second, while noting the interpretation of Price Waterhouse given
by Schwenk and Higgins, the Second Circuit did not reach the merits
of the issue as to whether "gender discrimination" or "discrimination
based on a failure to conform to gender norms" is cognizable under
Title VII. °9 The court cautioned that the Price Waterhouse sex stereo-
typing rule would not "bootstrap" sexual orientation claims into Title
VII because "not all homosexual men are stereotypically feminine, and
not all heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine.""'  The court
refused to consider the issue, finding "no basis in the record to sur-
mise" that Simonton behaved in a stereotypically feminine manner
and that the harassment he endured was, in fact, based on his non-
conformity with gender norms instead of his sexual orientation."'
The Second Circuit appears to accept the First and Ninth Cir-
cuits' reading of Price Waterhouse as proscribing gender discrimina-
tion. While the court refused to reach the issue, it did find Simonton's
sex stereotyping argument, while insufficiently pled, "more substan-
tial" than his other arguments."' Also, the court used the word "gen-
der" in invoking Oncale's membership test when, in fact, Justice Scalia
in writing the Oncale opinion never used the word "gender."'1 3 At the
same time, however, the Second Circuit categorically rejects sexual
orientation discrimination claims.
105. Id. at 34.
106. Id. at 36.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 37-38.
110. Id. at 38.
111. Id.
112. Id. at37.
113. It is highly likely that Justice Scalia, in writing the opinion, was aware of the different
meanings attached to the words "sex" and "gender." Indeed, he had, in the past, noted "the new
and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical character-
istics) distinctive to sexes" that the word "gender" has acquired. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Simonton represents the Second Circuit's recognition of the broad
sweep of Price Waterhouse and the court's fear, at the same time, of
opening the floodgate to homosexual plaintiffs' sexual harassment
claims alleging sex stereotyping. But, is such a concern legitimate or
even necessary? Recognizing otherwise valid sexual orientation dis-
crimination claims"4 will decrease, not increase, the number of such
claims in the long run by deterring discriminatory behaviors against
homosexual individuals in the workplace. The court's refusal to con-
sider Simonton's sex stereotyping argument is indefensible, especially
given the facts indicating discrimination with the use of stereotypes
connoting femininity: dolls and Playgirl magazine."'
C. Ninth Circuit: Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc.Y
6
One year after the Schwenk decision, which recognized gender
non-conformity discrimination as actionable under Title VII, the
Ninth Circuit in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. held that sexual ori-
entation discrimination falls outside the scope of the Act. In that case,
Medina Rene, a homosexual male, sued MGM Grand Hotel (MGM)
under Title VII for sexual harassment." 7 Rene alleged that, in an all-
male working environment at MGM, he had been "grabbed in the
crotch and poked in the anus on numerous occasions"; "caressed,
hugged, whistled and blown kisses at"; and "called 'sweetheart' and
'Muneca."'118 Despite the finding that the alleged harassment was "so
objectively offensive that it created a hostile work environment,"" 9 the
district court granted MGM's summary judgment motion because the
alleged discrimination was predicated on his homosexuality, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.
114. Beyond the "because of sex" threshold, homosexual sexual harassment plaintiffs must
also establish conduct that is "severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abu-
sive work environment" to recover. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81
(1998) (citation omitted).
115. Simonton later stated that he "doesn't grasp the distinction between sexual-orientation
discrimination and the evolving theory of bias based on nonconformity with 'gender norms.'
Jess Bravin, Courts Open Alternate Route to Extend Job-Bias Laws to Homosexuals, WALL ST. J.,
Sep. 22, 2000, at B1, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 26610639.
116. 243 F.3d 1206 (9thCir. 2001).
117. Id. at 1207.
118. Id. The word "Muneca" means "doll" in Spanish. Id. at 1207 n.2.
119. Id. at 1208.
120. Id. at 1207. The court emphasized Rene's own statement that he was harassed "be-
cause he was gay." Id. at 1210. However, Judge Nelson in dissent argued that "[tihe subjective
belief of the victim of sexual harassment that there is a non-sex-related reason for the harassment
is immaterial." Id. at 1211 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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While recognizing that the word sex in Title VII "refers to gen-
der,' ' 121 the Ninth Circuit followed the "eloquent words of the First
Circuit" in Higgins that "Title VII does not proscribe harassment
simply because of sexual orientation" no matter how noxious it may
be. 122  In so holding, the Ninth Circuit declared that its pre-Price
Waterhouse and Oncale precedent, DeSantis v. Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 123 in which the court held that sexual orientation discrimination is
not actionable under Title VII, is still good law. 24 Also, while noting
that the facts of the case are similar to those in Oncale, the court sim-
ply held that Oncale did not establish that the harassment alleged in
that case was actionable under Title VII but merely stands for a rejec-
tion of the per-se rule against same-sex sexual harassment claims. 125
The Ninth Circuit never mentioned Price Waterhouse or Schwenk
throughout the opinion. 1
26
The Rene decision is inconsistent with the logic and language of
Price Waterhouse and Oncale as articulated in Schwenk. Seven months
before the Rene decision, the Ninth Circuit had suggested, in the con-
text of immigration-asylum law, that the notions of gender and sexual
orientation are connected in comprising one's core identity. In Her-
nandez-Montiel v. INS,'27 a case involving a homosexual and effemi-
nately-perceived male plaintiff in Mexico, the Ninth Circuit held that
"sexual orientation" as well as "sexual identity" are immutable and
"so fundamental to one's identity that a person should not be required
to abandon them," concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to asylum
as belonging to a "particular social group" protected under the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act. 2 ' In so holding, the court noted that
"gay men with female sexual identities" are discriminated against be-
cause they are "perceived to assume the stereotypical 'female,' i.e.,
passive, role in gay relationships.' 1
29
Also, in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.,3' a recent
case involving, inter alia, a Title VII sexual harassment claim brought
121. Id. at 1209.
122. Id., (quoting Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir.
1999)).
123. 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979).
124. Rene, 243 F.3d at 1209.
125. Id. at 1208. This statement ignores the fact that the Oncale Court did remand the case
to the lower court. Indeed, "[if] the facts did ... not potentially support a case of sex discrimina-
tion, there would have been no basis for a remand... " Id. at 1211 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
126. Rene, in his briefs to the Ninth Circuit, did not mention Price Waterhouse or Schwenk.
See Appellant's Opening and Reply Briefs, Rene (No. 98-16924).
127. 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
128. Id. at 1093.
129. Id. at 1094.
130. No. 99-35579, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15899 (9th Cir. July 16, 2001).
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by Antonio Sanchez, an effeminately-perceived male, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, relying on Price Waterhouse and citing Schwenk, held that the al-
leged verbal abuse reflecting "a belief that Sanchez did not act as a
man should act" is actionable under Title VII. 3' There, Sanchez, an
employee of the defendant restaurant was called such names as a "fag-
got" and a "fucking female whore" and was mocked for walking and
carrying his serving tray "like a woman." '132 He was also referred to as
"she" and "her."' 33 In holding that the "because of sex" requirement
is met under the facts of the case, the court declared that the holding
in DeSantis that discrimination because of effeminacy is not actionable
under Title VII must lose as it "conflicts with Price Waterhouse."'34
On the court's rationale in Schwenk, Hernandez-Montiel, and
Nichols, it appears that at least effeminately-perceived male (or mascu-
line-appearing female) homosexual plaintiffs are protected under Title
VII. However, whether effeminately-perceived (or masculine-
appearing) or otherwise, homosexual individuals suffer gender dis-
crimination when they are discriminated against based on their sexual
orientation; to the extent that one's sexual orientation is deemed based
on his or her sex status in conjunction with the sex status of his or her
partners, sexual orientation is necessarily gender-based. 3 ' The Rene
decision is inconsistent with the dynamic definition of the word sex in
Title VII as pronounced in Price Waterhouse, which the Ninth Circuit
properly followed in Schwenk and Nichols.'36
D. Eighth Circuit: Schmedding v. Tnemec Co. "'
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Schmedding v. Tnemec Co. illus-
trates the court's recognition of the impracticality of the sex/sexual
131. Id. at *15-18. Similarly, the First Circuit has held that under the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act (ECOA), a biological male plaintiff who is dressed in "traditionally feminine at-
tire" may seek redress under the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping rule for discrimination based
on the perception that his "attire did not accord with his male gender." Rosa v. Park W. Bank &
Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 214-16 (1st Cir. 2000) (relying on Title VII case law in interpreting the
ECOA).
132. Nichols, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15899, at *3.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *17-18 (citing DeSantis v. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir.
1979)).
135. Valdes, supra note 3, at 25-16.
136. Indeed, the DeSantis court, in holding that "discrimination because of effeminacy, like
discrimination because of homosexuality ... or transsexualism (Holloway), does not fall within
the purview of Title VII," expressly relied on Holloway and its restrictive definition of "sex" in
the Act. See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 331-32. As Holloway is no longer good law after Price
Waterhouse, see discussion supra II(C), the Rene court's reliance on DeSantis for the proposition
that discrimination because of homosexuality is not actionable is on shaky ground, at best.
137. 187 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 1999).
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orientation dichotomy. In Schmedding, Nicholas Schmedding sued his
employer, Tnemec, alleging, inter alia, sexual harassment under Title
VII.' 38 The facts alleged were very similar to those alleged in Oncale
and Rene; Schmedding alleged that his co-workers taunted him for be-
ing a homosexual, spread rumors about his perceived sexual orienta-
tion, and subjected him to other harassment such as patting him on
the buttocks and asking him to perform sexual acts.139
Despite Schmedding's argument that his alleged harassers' moti-
vation was to "debase his masculinity" and not to attack his perceived
homosexuality, the district court granted Tnemec's motion to dismiss
by categorizing Schmedding's claim as a sexual orientation discrimina-
tion claim. 4' Upon Schmedding's appeal, the Eighth Circuit re-
manded the case for further consideration in light of Oncale.'4 How-
ever, the district court, again, granted Tnemec's renewed motion to
dismiss on the same ground.'42
Upon Schmedding's further appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that
Schmedding alleged sufficient facts to support his sexual harassment
claim under Title VII, reversing the trial court's dismissal."' The
court emphasized that the sexual harassment claim alleged by the
plaintiff in Oncale also included an allegation that he had been taunted
as being a homosexual.' The court held that mere inclusion in
Schmedding's claim of some "epithets connoting homosexuality" does
not "transform" his claim from one alleging sexual harassment to an-
other alleging harassment based on sexual orientation. 1
45
The Eighth Circuit, while not recognizing that sexual orientation
discrimination is actionable under Title VII,' 46 refused to pursue a
rigid sex/sexual orientation categorization. Schmedding alleged in his
complaint that he was called names such as "homo" and "jerk off."' 47
How can the court determine in a principled manner whether such
"epithets" were used to attack Schmedding's "homosexuality" or to
138. Id. at 863.
139. Id. at 865.
140. Id. at 863.
141. Id. at 864.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 865.
144. Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998)).
145. Id.
146. The court remanded the case to the district court "with instructions that plaintiff be
allowed to amend his complaint and proceed with the case." Id. at 865. In other words,
Schmedding could seek redress under Title VII upon deleting certain "epithets connoting homo-
sexuality" in his complaint. Id.
147. Id.
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debase his "masculinity?" Such a classification, even if possible, is
hardly meaningful in light of Title VII's statutory purpose.
E. Seventh Circuit: Spearman v. Ford Motor Co.
48
The Seventh Circuit still adheres to the anatomical sex rule and
Ulane. In Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., Edison Spearman, a homosex-
ual male, sued his employer, Ford Motor Company (Ford), under Ti-
tle VII, alleging, inter alia, sexual harassment.149 While working at
Ford's stamping plant as a "blanket operator," Spearman was harassed
by his co-workers with phrases such as "selfish bitch," "gay ass," "f -
[Spearman's] gay faggot ass up," "[y]ou f -ing jack-off," and "pussy-
ass." ' Spearman was also offended by graffiti: one on the bulletin
board stating "AIDS kills faggots dead... RuPaul, RuSpearman" and
another outside a portable toilet stating "Ed Sperman [sic] is a fag and
has AIDS" and "Edison Sperman [sic] is gay."'51
The district court found sufficient evidence to conclude that
Spearman was harassed because of his sex, noting that he "appears to
have been singled out because of the way he projected his gender, or
how his gender was perceived by his co-workers."'5 2 However, while
the court granted Ford's summary judgment motion against Spear-
man's sexual harassment claim on other grounds," 3 the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the summary judgment on the ground that Spearman
was not harassed because of his sex: he was harassed not because he
was a man but because he was gay.'54 Quoting Ulane, the court in-
voked the anatomical sex rule, holding that the word "sex" means only
"biological male or biological female" and not "one's sexuality or sex-
ual orientation.'
55
Spearman, relying on Price Waterhouse, argued that his harassers
were motivated by "sex stereotypes" due to Spearman's perceived fail-
ure to conform to the "masculine" environment at the Ford plant. 6
Specifically, he argued that his harassers engaged in sex stereotyping
in using the word "bitch," which is usually associated with a woman,
148. 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000).
149. Id. at 1082.
150. Id. at 1082-83.
151. Id. at 1083 (alteration in original). RuPaul is a "black, male drag queen and enter-
tainer." Id. at 1083 n.2.
152. Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-C0452, 1999 WL 754568, at *6 (N.D. I11. Sept.
9, 1999).
153. Id. (holding that Spearman failed to show that the harassment was severe or pervasive
enough to cause a hostile work environment).
154. 231 F.3dat 1085-86.
155. Id. at 1084, quoting Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
156. Id. at 1085.
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as well as in associating Spearman with a drag queen (RuPaul).5 7
However, the court held that Price Waterhouse was inapplicable be-
cause Spearman's co-workers used stereotypical statements to "express
their hostility to [Spearman's] perceived homosexuality" and "not to
harass him because he is a man." '158 The court simply stated that the
word "bitch," according to another utility worker at Ford, meant not
only a "woman" but also a "faggot."15 9 The court held that the graffiti
depicting Spearman as "gay," a "fag," and a drag queen confirmed
Ford workers' hostility to Spearman's "sexual orientation, and not to
his sex." 6'
The Seventh Circuit's adherence to the anatomical sex rule is ir-
reconcilable with the First and Ninth Circuits' interpretation of Price
Waterhouse in Higgins and Schwenk. The Seventh Circuit reads Price
Waterhouse to hold that Title VII reaches sex stereotyping that is
strictly based on one's anatomical male/female status. This reading of
Price Waterhouse, however, simply misses the point. As articulated by
the Ninth Circuit in Schwenk, the sex stereotyping rule effectively
renders gender-based discrimination actionable under Title VII. Un-
der Price Waterhouse, Spearman clearly alleged gender discrimination:
he suffered stereotypes attached to homosexuals, who fail to conform
to socially-constructed "heterosexual" gender norms. Indeed, there is
no meaningful distinction between the stereotypes attached to the
words "macho" (when applied to a woman) and "faggot" (when ap-
plied to a man). Both words represent society's negative treatment
towards those who fail to meet gender roles perceived by society as
congruous with one's anatomical sex.1 '
Also, the Seventh Circuit's reliance on Oncale for the proposition
that the "because of sex" statutory language operates to bar sexual ori-
entation discrimination claims162 is unwarranted. While emphasizing
the language, the Oncale Court did not say that sexual orientation dis-
crimination can never fall within the "entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women in employment."' 63 Indeed, Justice
157. Id. at 1085-86.
158. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)).
159. Id. at 1086.
160. Id.
161. See Valdes, suprTa note 3, at 12-16 (arguing that the words "queer," sissy," "dyke,"
and "tomboy" carry a "common sting" precisely because "sex," "gender," and "sexual orienta-
tion" conflate to "forcibly homogenize human personalities, including sexualities"). Professor
Valdes explains that because "sex" conflates with "gender" and both "sex" and "gender" conflate
with "sexual orientation," any sexual orientation discrimination is "literally, effectively, and un-
avoidably" sex discrimination. Id.
162. See Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1085.
163. 523 U.S. at 78 (citation omitted).
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Scalia refrained from categorically rejecting the same-sex sex discrimi-
nation claims even though such discrimination was "assuredly not the
principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title
VII."' 64 Price Waterhouse and Oncale, read together, do not support a
per se rejection of a Title VII claim for discrimination based on one's
homosexual or transsexual status.
In the following section, this Note critiques the Seventh Circuit's
continued adherence to the anatomical sex rule, arguing that such a
rule is not only unwarranted under Price Waterhouse and Oncale but
also unjustifiable as a legal principle.
IV. THE ANATOMICAL SEX RULE IS UNJUSTIFIABLE.
As discussed, the sex-means-only-anatomical-sex rule as fol-
lowed in cases like Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane operated to cate-
gorically exclude transsexuals as a class from Title VII's protection.
The exclusion of transsexuals was justified with the following line of
reasoning: (1) that the plain meaning of the word "sex" is nothing
more than the biological male/female dichotomy;16 (2) that Congress
intended the word "sex" to be interpreted consistently with the tradi-
tional notions of sex, which are based on individuals' anatomical
sex;166 (3) that one's biological facts include "chromosomes, internal
and external genitalia, hormones, and gonads"; 67 and (4) that trans-
sexualism is a psychological, not biological, phenomenon. 168  Thus
held, transsexuals should be excluded from Title VII's protection as a
class. 69
This reasoning, however, is flawed because it is premised upon
faulty assumptions. First, the notion that the plain meaning of the
word "sex" is nothing more than one's biological facts ignores the
changing societal practices treating transsexuals in accordance with
their self-described gender. Second, Title VII's legislative history
does not show what Congress intended the word "sex" to mean. Fi-
nally, recent medical studies suggest that transsexualism is a biological
phenomenon.
164. Id. at 79.
165. E.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
166. E.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977).
167. E.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083 n.6.
168. Id. at 1083 n.3 ("Transsexualism is a condition that exists when a physiologically
normal person (i.e., not a hermaphrodite-a person whose sex is not clearly defined due to a con-
genital condition) experiences discomfort or discontent about nature's choice of his or her par-
ticular sex and prefers to be the other sex.").
169. Id. at 1085.
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A. Is the Plain Meaning of the Word "Sex" Only Anatomical?
In giving the word "sex" its plain meaning, the Holloway line of
cases held that the "because of sex" language of Title VII operates to
exclude transsexuals from the scope of Title VII. According to the
maxim of textual analysis, the words of Title VII, to the extent that
they are not otherwise defined, "should be given their ordinary, com-
mon meaning."' 7  Justice Thomas's short statement in his concur-
rence in Oncale, while not joined by any other Justices, illustrates the
view that the scope of Title VII is delineated by the plain meaning of
the language "because of ... sex." '171
The plain meaning of the word "sex" in Title VII was held to be
defined by "the traditional notions of sex," which was, in turn, held to
be based on one's anatomical factors.172  For example, the Holloway
court cited the definition of "sex" given by Webster's Seventh New
Collegiate Dictionary as "traditional definition based on anatomical
characteristics"; the dictionary defines sex as (1) "two [male or female]
divisions of organisms" or (2) "the sum of the ... peculiarities of liv-
ing beings that subserve reproduction by two interacting parents and
distinguish males and females.'
'1 73
In Holloway, the Ninth Circuit distinguished a born female who
is discriminated against because she is a woman (protected by Title
VII) from a male-to-female transsexual who is discriminated against
"because she is a transsexual who chose to change her sex" (unpro-
tected).'74 Is there any meaningful reason why the court should draw a
line between a "born female [and a female who] was born ambiguous
and chose to become female?' 17 Isn't the fact that Holloway was a
"purported female" on the day she was fired enough to survive a mo-
tion to dismiss?
176
In accordance with Holloway, the Seventh Circuit in Ulane em-
phasized that "an individual's sex" is not synonymous with "an indi-
vidual's sexual identity disorder or discontent with the sex into which
they were born."' 77 According to the court, "[t]he words of Title VII
170. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
171. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I concur because the Court stresses
that in every sexual harassment case, the plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove Title VII's
statutory requirement that there be discrimination 'because of... sex.').
172. E.g., Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
173. Id. at 662 n.4. The definition also includes "sexually motivated phenomena or behav-
ior" and "sexual intercourse." Id.
174. Id. at 664.
175. Id. at 664-65 (Goodwin, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's formalistic interpre-
tation of Title VII).
176. See id. (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
177. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
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do not outlaw discrimination against a person who has a sexual iden-
tity disorder."' 178 But, is our definition of what it means to be a man or
a woman just "a cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes" ?179 Shouldn't
our gender identity count?
This plain meaning analysis is flawed because no satisfactory ex-
planation is given as to why the ordinary, common meaning of sex is
anatomical sex. First, courts ignore the fact that the concepts of sex
and gender are so closely intertwined that most people use these words
interchangeably. For example, Webster's definition of gender in-
cludes "1: SEX."' 80 Indeed, some courts have used these words inter-
changeably in their opinions.'
Second, the facts in most cases involving transsexuals suggest
that society in fact accepts them in accordance with their self-
identified sex. For example, Karen Ulane, a male-to-female transsex-
ual, was successful in amending her birth-certificate as well as her
FAA certification to comport with her self-identified female gender,
and the trial court in Ulane did find that "society ... considers Ulane
to be female."' 82  Ramona Holloway changed her first name from
Robert to Ramona on her employment records. 3 Also, each of the
male-to-female transsexual plaintiffs in Holloway, Sommers, Ulane,
and Schwenk were referred to as "she" in the corresponding opinions.
It may be that the change in the societal understanding of what it
means to be a man or a woman has simply outpaced judicial as well as
legislative cognizance.
Further, underlying this plain meaning analysis is the notion of
the absolute binarism of sex, according to which there are only two
sexes: men and women.'84 Such a view ignores the existence of mil-
lions of intersexed individuals who have ambiguous sex-determining
factors such as genes or chromosomes (XX or XY), gonads (testes or
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 1084 (noting the district court judge's finding that the word "sex" in Title VII
encompasses a "psychological question" including individual's self-perception as well as the so-
ciety's perception of the individual).
180. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 510 (1983).
181. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (holding that Title VII
proscribes discrimination "because of... gender"); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
239-41 (1989) (using the words "sex" and "gender" interchangeably).
182. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083, 1087.
183. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
184. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (holding that Title VII's provision proscribing sex dis-
crimination "means that it is lawful to discriminate against women because they are women and
against men because they are men").
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ovaries), morphology (sex organs), hormones (androgens or estrogens),
and phenotypes (existence of facial and chest hair, etc.).
1 85
The reality is that sex and gender exist in a spectrum where male
and female represent the two ends of the poles.186 It is the birth atten-
dant who determines the sex designation on the birth certificate, 187 and
those with ambiguous external genitalia (e.g., genetic XX females with
abnormally large clitoris or genetic XY males with abnormally small
penis) are turned into two binary sexes based in part on gender-role
stereotypes: the capacity for a penis to penetrate a female's vagina re-
gardless of reproductive capacity and the female reproductive capabil-
ity regardless of the appearance of external genitalia.'88 Thus, the no-
tion of sex as a binary model is a product of our culture, and sex
discrimination occurs because of our normative values attached to a
man and a woman.'89
In short, the anatomical sex rule cannot be justified based upon
the plain meaning of the word "sex" (1) because of the growing socie-
tal recognition of individuals' self gender-identity as a sex-determining
factor and (2) because of the reality that there is no purely "biological"
male-female distinction.
B. Did Congress Intend the Word "Sex" to be Construed Narrowly?
There is no evidence that Congress intended the word "sex" in
Title VII to mean "biological male or biological female" and not
"sexuality or sexual orientation" in enacting the Act. 9 ° The total lack
of legislative history addressing the meaning of sex under Title VII as
well as the fact that the word "sex" was added as a floor amendment
without debate just one day before the House's approval of Title
VII 9' were used by Holloway and Ulane to support the courts' conclu-
185. See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 283 (citing JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE
BODY AND RELATED SYNDROMES: A GUIDE TO COUNSELING CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS
AND THEIR FAMILIES (2d ed. 1994)).
186. Fausto-Sterling, supra note 2, at 21.
187. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 271.
188. Alice Domurat Dreger, "Ambiguous Sex"-or Ambivalent Medicine? Ethical Issues in
the Treatment of Intersexuality, 28 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 24, 27-28 (1998).
189. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 272 (arguing that sex is "a social construct rather than a
biological fact"); Franke, supra note 3, at 5 (arguing that "differences between men and women
are grounded not in biology, but in gender normativity").
190. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Bibby v. Phila-
delphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 509, 516 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ("It seems clear from the
context of the statute that Congress intended the word 'sex' in Title VII to refer to biological dis-
tinctions rather than to sexual activity or consciousness of sex.").
191. See Robert Stevens Miller, Jr., Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 880 (1967).
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sion that "Congress never considered nor intended that this 1964
legislation apply to anything other than the traditional concept of
sex."'Also, these courts held that occasional failed attempts by some
members of Congress to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination
based on "affectional or sexual orientation" was strong evidence that
Congress intended the word "sex" in Title VII to be given "a narrow,
traditional interpretation," which excludes not only homosexuals but
also transsexuals. 193 Moreover, Congress's continued silence on Title
VII in the face of the judicial interpretation precluding transsexuals'
recovery under Title VII was treated as a proxy for proof that Con-
gress intended to keep transsexuals out of the scope of Title VII. 194
This legislative history analysis is unsatisfying in that the courts
cannot identify the exact legislative intent with respect to the meaning
of sex in Title VII. When there is no clear legislative history on point,
how can the courts decide that Congress intended the word "sex" to
mean only "the traditional notions of sex," which are based on one's
biological facts? There is nothing to suggest that Congress meant the
word "sex" to be interpreted according to what it initially contem-
plated the word to mean. On the contrary, it is more sensible to con-
clude that, by using a general term, without specific definition, Con-
gress intended the judiciary to interpret the word liberally in such a
manner consistent with the underlying statutory purpose.
For example, in Price Waterhouse, Justice Brennan read the lan-
guage of Title VII in a dynamic, not a static, way. Brennan read the
text of Title VII liberally in such a manner as to effectuate the under-
lying policy behind the Act, which is "to drive employers to focus on
qualifications rather than on race, religion, sex, or national origin. '
Applying this policy in light of its "present societal, political, and legal
context, '"19 he concluded that Title VII reaches sex stereotyping,
which is no longer acceptable in today's society.'
192. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
193. Id. at 1085-86.
194. Seeid. at 1086.
195. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 243. One federal district court has said:
In our society we too often form opinions of people on the basis of skin color, religion,
national origin, style of dress, hair length, and other superficial features.... [I]n
adopting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to attack these stereotyped
characterizations so that people would be judged by their intrinsic worth.
Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of Am., 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
196. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479
(1987). Professor Eskridge argues that "the legal and constitutional context of the statute may
change" with time. Id. at 1480. He argues for statutory interpretation which entails considera-
tion of "not only what the legislation means abstractly, or even on the basis of legislative history,
but also what it ought to mean in terms of the needs and goals of our present day society." Id.
197. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
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Brennan's reading of Title VII is consistent with the dynamic
statutory reading as defined by Professor William Eskridge in his arti-
cle Dynamic Statutory Interpretation published two years before the
Price Waterhouse decision.198 According to Professor Eskridge, Con-
gress's failure to define sex discrimination in Title VII calls for "judi-
cial creativity" given that Congress "has set forth general policy and
has left courts substantial freedom to adapt the general language to
changed circumstances." '199 He states, "Title VII is, in that sense, a
common law statute.
200
Schwenk followed this dynamic reading of Title VII. In
Schwenk, the Ninth Circuit considered the Congressional codification
of Price Waterhouse's "gender-motivating-factor" test in 199121 as an
implicit Congressional endorsement of the dynamic reading of Title
VII.2°2  The court then concluded that "Congress, in drafting the
GMVA, was aware of the interpretation given by the pre-Price
Waterhouse federal courts to the terms 'sex' and 'gender' under Title
VII and acted intentionally to incorporate the broader concept of 'gen-
der. "'203
In its 1991 Amendments to Title VII, Congress specifically
looked at the Price Waterhouse decision yet left intact the sex stereo-
typing rule while overruling some other aspects of the opinion.20 4 The
fact that Congress did not elect to limit the potentially broad reach of
the sex stereotyping rule suggests Congress's implicit approval of the
Court's dynamic reading of Title VII. Indeed, Congress's failure to
amend Title VII to specifically cover transsexual and homosexual in-
dividuals is insufficient evidence, at best, to demonstrate Congres-
sional intent to specifically exclude these individuals from the Act's
protection. Given Congress's implicit approval of the sex stereotyping
rule, there is no reason why the courts should not apply the rule in a
principled manner to all individual plaintiffs.
198. Eskridge, supra note 196, at 1517.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994)) (providing that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie
case by showing that sex was a motivating factor even when other factors also motivated the
practice).
202. See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201.
203. Id. at 1201 n.12.
204. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994); see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 n.3 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that Congress did not overrule the Price Water-
house sex stereotyping rule while overruling that part of the opinion in which the Court held that
the defendant can avoid liability for intentional discrimination if it can show that the same action
would have occurred regardless of its discriminatory motive).
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Schwenk combined the dynamic reading of Title VII in Price
Waterhouse with Oncale's reasoning in rejecting the per-se rule against
male-on-male sexual harassment claims to conclude that categorical
exclusion of transsexuals from Title VII's protection is no longer vi-
able. While discrimination based on one's transsexual status is not the
"principal evil" that Title VII was enacted to combat, it is a "reasona-
bly comparable evil" given the statutory purpose to encourage em-
ployers to make employment decisions based on one's merits rather
than on one's sex or gender.
Further, there is a statutory maxim that "remedial legislation
should be construed broadly to effectuate its purpose. "205 The Ninth
Circuit in Schwenk considered that broad interpretation of the word
"gender" in GMVA, and, thus, "sex" in Title VII, was "particularly
appropriate given the remedial [statutory] purposes. '"206 By giving a
narrow definition of sex, the Holloway line of cases actually frustrates
the legislative purpose.
There is concern about the judiciary's acting like a super-
legislature in broadly reading Title VII to accommodate the rights of
transsexuals or homosexuals without express authorization by Con-
gress."0 7 However, it is the judiciary's duty "to say what the law is. '"208
When Congress uses a general term without a specific definition, the
courts should read the language in a manner consistent with the un-
derlying statutory purpose in light of the current societal, political,
and legal context.2" 9
C. Is Transsexualism a Purely Psychological Phenomenon?
Lastly, the anatomical sex rule should not be used to exclude
transsexuals when there is no consensus in the medical profession as to
205. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201 n.12 (citation omitted). But see Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc.,
742 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting, but ignoring, the maxim).
206. 204 F.3d at 1201 n.12 (citation omitted).
207. See, e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086 (citation omitted) (holding that for the court "to
hold that Title VII protects transsexuals would take [the court] out of the realm of interpreting
and reviewing and into the realm of legislating").
208. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) ("[I]t is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.").
209. The democratic process in our representative government will not be undermined by
dynamic reading of Title VII given the "incremental, precedent-oriented nature of the judicial
process and the availability of statutory correction of judicial errors." Eskridge, supra note 196,
at 1524.
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the exact causes of transsexualism. Indeed, how can courts conclude
that a male-to-female transsexual plaintiff is a biological male?210
Contrary to the notion that transsexuals choose to change their
assigned sex for their purely psychological problems, recent medical
studies suggest that gender identity is, indeed, biologically based and
immutable.2 11 The following well-known "John/Joan" case study212 is
a good example.
A genetically male boy, John, had his penis accidentally ablated
during circumcision.213 When he was eight months old, John was
turned into a girl by surgical reconstruction of the genitals and was
raised as a girl (Joan) without knowledge of this history.214 However,
John-turned-Joan always considered himself as male despite the fact
that Joan was very good looking as a girl; Joan often tried to stand to
urinate despite the absence of a penis. 2 1S Resisting an estrogen hor-
mone medication, Joan chose to become a boy again by way of surgery
and hormone treatments when he learned of his medical history at the
age fourteen. 216 According to now-John, "[a]ll of a sudden, everything
clicked" when his father told him of the history "in a tearful episode"
after Joan's prodding.217 John is now living as a male and a husband to
a woman with adopted children.218
This story suggests a link between one's gender-identity and
"biological" sex and refutes the notion that gender-identity is deter-i, ,, , ,,21" Reet"tdisa
mined by "nurture," not "nature. Recent studies at Johns Hopkins
210. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 1 (1992) (describing his "belated dis-
covery that judges know next to nothing about sex and sexuality beyond their own personal ex-
perience, which is limited, perhaps more so than average").
211. Chanika Phornphutkul et al., Gender Self-Reassignment in an XY Adolescent Female
Born With Ambiguous Genitalia, PEDIATRICS, July, 2000, at 106, 135-37 ("Gender identification
is a complex biological and psychological process."); see also Deardorff, supra note 6 (quoting Dr.
Randi Ettner, a University of Chicago Gender Board member, who said that transsexualism is a
"birth condition, not a lifestyle choice" and that transsexuals "come into the world with this con-
dition" with "no known cure").
212. Milton Diamond & H. Keith Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment at Birth: Long-Term Re-
view and Clinical Implications, ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 15 at 298-304
(1997). This story has been reported in various newspaper articles. See, e.g., Shari Roan, The
Basis of Sexual Identity: He Was a Boy, Became a Girl, and Then a Boy Again. His Case Helps
Show the Brain's Role in Gender, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997, at El, available at LEXIS, News,
Los Angeles Times.
213. Milton Diamond & H. Keith Sigmundson, supra note 212, at 298-99.
214. Id. at 299.
215. Id. at 300.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 301.
219. Suzanne Miller, When Sexual Development Goes Awry, WORLD AND I, Sep. 1, 2000,
at 148, available at 2000 WL 9051058 (stating that "gender identity results from a complex mix-
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Children's Center buttress the gender-identity/biology link: two stud-
ies showed that prenatal exposure to normal male hormones alone dic-
tated male gender identity in genetically male (XY) children born
without a penis and raised as females. 22' Given that, transsexualism,
or gender-identity disorder, may be explained in terms of biology, not
psychology.
Further, when the biological sex status of a transsexual plaintiff
is medically ambiguous, placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove
such a status would effectively preclude his or her recovery. Such a
result is inconsistent with the remedial nature of the Act.
In sum, the invocation of the anatomical sex rule to exclude
transsexuals from Title VII's protection as a class is wrong because the
language of Title VII, the legislative history, and current medical un-
derstanding of transsexualism do not support such a rule. The Sev-
enth Circuit's continued application of the anatomical sex rule is, thus,
unwarranted and only represents the court's blind adherence to Ulane.
V. A GRADUAL YET PROMISING TREND
So far, this Note has shown that the Ninth Circuit's "sex plus
gender" rule in Schwenk is superior to the Seventh Circuit's "anatomi-
cal sex" rule. This section examines the likelihood of success for fu-
ture transsexual and homosexual Title VII sex discrimination plain-
tiffs in light of Schwenk and other Title VII cases interpreting Price
Waterhouse and Oncale.
Under the Ninth Circuit's approach in Schwenk, transsexual
plaintiffs will easily survive the "because of sex" statutory hurdle by
showing that the discrimination was based on their perceived failure to
meet societal expectations attached to their assigned sex. While this
involves fact-intensive inquiries, such inquiry is not unique to trans-
sexual plaintiffs.
Likewise, transsexual plaintiffs will be allowed to seek redress
under Title VII for discrimination grounded on their transsexual
status in the First, Second, and Eighth Circuits, which recognize gen-
der discrimination as actionable under Title VII. While these circuits
have yet to recognize the merits of "sexual orientation" discrimination
claims under Title VII, transsexuals, who try to conform themselves
ture of factors, including genes, gonads (testes and ovaries), hormones, internal duct systems,
external genitalia, and environmental influences").
220. JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS, HOPKINS RESEARCH SHOWS NATURE, NOT NURTURE, DETERMINES
GENDER (May 12, 2000), available at http://hopkins.med.jhu.edu/press/2000/MAY/000512.
htm.
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with the male/female gender binarism, will likely convince the courts
that they are victims of gender discrimination.
The Seventh Circuit's continued adherence to Ulane's anatomical
sex rule is dispiriting for transsexual plaintiffs. Rhetoric aside, how-
ever, the court's recognition in Spearman of Price Waterhouse as pro-
scribing stereotypes associated with either a male or female sex status
effectively doomed the application of the anatomical sex rule to trans-
sexual plaintiffs. Transsexuals are usually discriminated against be-
cause they are perceived to be too masculine (or too feminine) for their
assigned female (or male) sex status.
Unlike their transsexual counterparts, homosexual plaintiffs still
face an uphill, albeit not impossible, battle in surviving a "because of
sex" challenge. Among the federal circuits, the Eighth Circuit appears
to be the most favorable to homosexual plaintiffs. The Eighth Circuit,
in light of Schmedding's rejection of the rigid sex/sexual orientation
categorization, will not dismiss their sex stereotyping claims even
when the alleged stereotypes are those typically attached to homosexu-
ality; homosexual plaintiffs will be allowed to proceed with their
claims insofar as there is some basis for the court to find that such
stereotypes were used to debase their masculinity or femininity.221 It
is unclear, however, whether the court, for such a finding, requires al-
legations of some form of physical sexual advance, which were present
in both Schmedding and Oncale.222 Such a requirement would unduly
narrow the scope of actionable sexual harassment and is inconsistent
with Price Waterhouse.
On the other hand, the First, Second, Seventh, and Ninth Cir-
cuits appear adamant in dismissing homosexual plaintiffs' sex dis-
crimination claims as sexual orientation discrimination claims unless
the plaintiffs somehow convince the courts that the alleged discrimina-
tion was strictly grounded on their assumption of either feminine or
masculine characteristics, something that is contrary to the stereotypes
attached to their sex.
As suggested by the Eighth Circuit in Schmedding, however, this
sex/sexual orientation dichotomy is inherently unworkable, especially
after Price Waterhouse. Courts should stop making mechanical and
221. One district court expressly followed Schmedding, holding that the student plaintiff
stated a sex discrimination claim under Title IX even though his allegations included the use of
epithets connoting homosexuality such as "fag" and "gay" besides the allegations of sexually-
motivated conduct such as "grabbing his buttocks and inner thighs." Montgomery v. Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1084, 1093 (D. Minn. 2000).
222. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (involving allegations of
physical sexual attack); Schmedding, 187 F.3d at 865 (involving allegations of patting Schmed-
ding on the buttocks and asking him to perform sexual acts).
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futile inquiries into what stereotypes are attached to masculinity or
femininity on the one hand and what stereotypes are attached to sexual
orientation on the other. Many words denote both masculinity or
femininity and homosexuality. For example, as noted by the Spear-
man court, the word "bitch" can be associated with both a woman and
a homosexual. Courts should instead look to the statutory purpose and
ask what are the evils that Title VII was designed to rectify in pro-
scribing "the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes. "223
In sum, the current flux in federal sex discrimination jurispru-
dence as to the meaning of sex discrimination under Title VII reflects
the federal courts' gradual shift away from formalism towards a more
realistic approach in this area, following Price Waterhouse and Oncale.
This trend is promising for transsexual and homosexual individuals
confronting gender biases in the workplace. More importantly, the
federal judiciary should recognize that its retreat to the categorical re-
gime, for which there is no clear and coherent theoretical justification,
would jeopardize society's trust and confidence in principled judicial
adjudication of Title VII sex discrimination claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit in Schwenk correctly applied the Supreme
Court's decisions in Price Waterhouse and Oncale in interpreting the
word "sex" in Title VII to encompass not only biological sex but also
socially-constructed gender. Schwenk stands for a refreshing depar-
ture from the federal circuits' categorical rejection of sex discrimina-
tion claims brought by transsexuals. On the other hand, the federal
courts' continued application of the sex/sexual orientation dichotomy
in rejecting homosexual plaintiffs' sex discrimination claims is unwar-
ranted and has led to the making of arbitrary decisions based on un-
principled rules of thumb.
Sex discrimination is gender discrimination; sex discrimination
takes place because of the socially-constructed male/female classifica-
tion. Transsexuals and homosexuals, who are often viewed as not
conforming to the societal binary and heterosexual gender norms, de-
serve no less Title VII protection than that which is accorded to any
other human beings.
223. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989); see also McVeigh v. Cohen,
983 F. Supp. 215, 220 (D.D.C. 1998) (recognizing, in the context of the privacy interests of the
plaintiff U.S. Navy officer under the statutory "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue" policy,
that "[iut is self-evident that a person's sexual orientation does not affect that individual's per-
formance in the workplace").
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More than a decade ago, the Court read the language of Title VII
as forward-looking and declared that "we are beyond the day" when
discrimination against a female employee for her perceived "macho"
personality could legally be tolerated. 224  Living in the twenty-first
century, we are past the day when discrimination based on one's sexu-
ality or sexual orientation could legally be sanctioned. Courts should
hold that discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation
is discrimination "because of sex" under Title VII.
224. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
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